Annotated Water Integrity Scans

A manual to help assess integrity levels in specific sub-sectors of the water sector

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The Water Integrity Network (WIN)

The Water Integrity Network, formed in 2006, aims to fight corruption in the water sector. It stimulates anti-corruption activities in the water sector locally, nationally and globally. It promotes solutions-oriented action and coalition-building between civil society, the private and public sectors, media and governments.

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The IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre

The IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre is a global water and sanitation organisation. It facilitates the sharing, promotion and use of knowledge so that governments, professionals and organisations can better support poor men, women and children in developing countries to access water and sanitation services.

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A woman in Pamplona Alta, Lima - Peru, next to the big blue drums they use to fill with potable water that trucks deliver to them every two days. This water is at least four times more expensive than water other people usually have at home. © Marco Simola, finalist WIN photo competition 2011

Acronyms

ACF: Anti-corruption framework

ACL: Anti-corruption legislation

ACM: Anti-corruption measures

AWIS: Annotated Water Integrity Scan

GII: Ghana Integrity Initiative

IP: Integrity pact

IPP: Investment projects and programmes

IWRM: Integrated water resource management

MoU: Memorandum of Understanding

PL: Policy and legislation

R: Regulation

RAS-HON: Red de Agua y Saneamiento de Honduras

SP: Service provision

SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

TAP: Transparency, accountability and participation

TI: Transparency International

TISDA: Transparency and Integrity in Service Delivery in Africa

TNC: Transnational company

WIN: Water Integrity Network

WRM: Water resource management

Preface

ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVE OF THIS MANUAL

The Annotated Water Integrity Scan (AWIS) responds to the call made in the 2008 Global Corruption Report (GCR) for participatory and qualitative tools to analyse corruption in, and enhance the integrity of, water service development and delivery.

The AWIS is a diagnostic tool for multi-stakeholder workshops, and has three main objectives:

1. Establish an overview of the integrity of different sub-sectors of the water sector, to highlight areas which are vulnerable to corruption.
2. Identify priority areas for action to enhance water integrity.
3. Increase awareness about the water integrity situation and stimulate improvement.

The AWIS will be repeated annually (or every two years) to explore whether it can be used as a monitoring tool.

This manual is meant for a broad group of actors interested in exploring and improving integrity and governance in the water sector. This includes staff from government agencies, NGOs, think tanks, universities, the private sector and other organisations involved in development co-operation and the water sector. Policy makers and managers may be particularly interested in the promotion of the tool and the implications of its findings. The manual will also help potential facilitators of AWIS workshops as they prepare for their session.

The AWIS was developed for WIN by Jan Teun Visscher with support from John Butterworth, both from IRC. The underlying concept is based on work done with Francesc Bellaubi in the Transparency and Integrity in Service Delivery in Africa (TISDA) project by Transparency International (TI). The AWIS methodology has been reviewed by Teun Bastemeijer, Jenni Laxén, Erik Nielsen, Alexandra Malmqvist and Maël Castellan of WIN, Ania Grobicky of the Global Water Partnership, Håkan Tropp of the UNDP Water Governance Facility and Francesc Bellaubi of TI. The methodology was amended after a pilot workshop in Ghana organised by Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII) and WIN, and again after a workshop in Honduras organised by Red de Agua y Saneamiento de Honduras (RAS-HON). The tool has been used in Burkina Faso and Benin, and deliberated upon in Mali and Sri Lanka. AWIS has been improved based on feedback from its first applications, and is still in the process of development.

A preliminary draft of this AWIS manual was developed by the WIN team with the help of Malte Gephart (from the German Institute of Global and Area Studies) and Jan Teun Visscher, and presented at a review workshop in Berlin on 19-20 May 2011. After that workshop, Jan Teun Visscher and Janek Hermann-Friede revised and completed the manual.

WATER INTEGRITY

Water is a thirst quencher, a crop grower and a power generator. It is fundamental to hygiene and is a basic natural resource, vital for our daily existence and for human survival. In July 2010 this was acknowledged by the UN General Assembly when it officially recognised access to drinking water and sanitation as a human right. Water is also a foundation for development. Without it, there can be no economic growth, no industry, no hydropower, no agriculture and no cities.

Despite this recognition of the importance of water, major problems persist in its management and delivery. More than 800 million people have no access to improved sources of drinking water and another 2.6 billion people do not have access to improved sanitation [JMP, 2010]. In many countries, more than 50 per cent of water in piped supplies is unaccounted for, due to leaking pipes and illegal tapping [GCR, 2008], [JMP, 2010]. The problems persist as competition is distorted and crucial investment is either lacking, delayed or undertaken ineffectively. These problems are not simply due to scarcity of water or financial resources. They are perpetuated by a lack of integrity in the water sector. In the words of the Global Corruption Report, 2008: "The water crisis is a governance crisis with corruption at its core."

This issue requires urgent attention of all stakeholders as enhancing integrity may make a major contribution to free-up financial resources to improve sector performance.

The implementation of the AWIS for specific sub-sectors can help to stimulate dialogue between key stakeholders and detect specific integrity challenges which must be addressed to reduce the risk of corruption. The tool is low-cost and can be adapted to different sub-sectors. It is designed to be carried out in a single day by eight to twelve expert participants, each of them knowledgeable about water governance in a given sub-sector. The AWIS is a collective problem analysis, highlighting priority areas in need of action, which can serve as the basis for developing proposals to improve integrity. The results of the work of this expert group should then be shared with other sector actors to serve as inspiration for action. It is envisaged that by repeating the AWIS it can serve as a qualitative and participatory monitoring tool, but this will need further testing.

WIN is promoting the AWIS as a practical and multifunctional tool and has established a community of practice to share experiences and develop it further. For more information on the community of practice contact WIN Secretariat (info@waterintegritynetwork.net),

Part A. Guiding information

The Water Authority installed free clean drinking water outlet for the poor living around Gulshan, Dhaka. But as normal corrupt practice in Bangladesh would have it: people have to pay. © Gregory Wait, finalist WIN photo competition 2011

1. Introduction

Beijing China. © Eefje Aarnoudse

The AWIS helps to improve integrity by facilitating constructive dialogue between different water sector stakeholders on issues related to transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP), as well as the existing anti-corruption framework (ACF) and anti-corruption measures (ACM). This dialogue may help policy-makers, local government officials, utility staff, regulators, private sector providers and consultants, civil society organisations, international development agencies, and representatives of the water-user communities to establish priority actions which enhance water integrity and governance. The AWIS does not measure corruption directly, but rather sheds light on systemic weaknesses in the governance framework which leave the water sector vulnerable to corruption.

"The AWIS helps to improve integrity by facilitating constructive dialogue between different water sectors stakeholders"

The AWIS serves three purposes, which are especially important in contexts of economic poverty, poor water governance and precarious water service delivery:

1. It establishes an overview of the state of integrity in different sub-sectors of the water sector which will highlight the potential risks of corruption that exist. The AWIS facilitates exchange and documentation of knowledge on the state of TAP in different water sub-sectors and the related ACF. The way problems are perceived differs between various actors because of varying levels of expert knowledge, different perspectives and lack of communication. AWIS brings the views of a small but diverse group of experts together to provide an annotated overview of the integrity situation in the respective sub-sector.

2. It identifies priority areas for action, in order to enhance integrity. An AWIS identifies and analyses challenges to integrity in water governance in each of the different sub-sectors. The methodology thereby recognises that water supply encounters different challenges to sanitation, for example, and that each service is confronted with unique sets of problems in either urban or rural areas. The expert group – which needs to represent the views of the different stakeholder groups – will identify specific areas where measures should be taken to strengthen the water governance framework and improve water integrity. The participation of experts with different backgrounds, and with links to different stakeholder groups, should effectively neutralise bias and eliminate incorrect annotations.

3. It increases awareness of the state of water integrity and stimulates action among sector stakeholders. The results of the AWIS need to be documented and shared among the different stakeholder groups and decision-makers, so they can comment on the outcome. This will help to validate the findings and initiate action. The AWIS itself will only identify priority areas for action. A next step is usually needed to formulate specific actions. Therefore, it is important to realise that the AWIS is not a stand-alone activity. It needs to be embedded in a process that ensures results are discussed among stakeholders that have a mandate to improve governance in the respective sub-sector(s). So, ideally, the AWIS will become part of existing stakeholder initiatives and will be used to strengthen them.

It is envisaged that the AWIS can also be used to monitor change by repeating it annually, or every two years, and comparing results. Preferably, this would be combined with monitoring of the specific water integrity activities that have been implemented. The use of the AWIS as a potential monitoring tool will be subject to further analysis by WIN and by the community of practice that is being established.

It is important to be aware of some of the limitations of the AWIS. It is a quick scan of the situation carried out by a relatively small group of experts who together may have considerable insight but who may not know everything about the sector and its stakeholders. By sharing the results with a wider group of stakeholders for comments the impact of this limitation can be reduced.

Dialogue is needed to help "establish priority actions which enhance water integrity and governance"

2. Integrity background

Rainwater tank for handwashing in a public school in Kigali, Rwanda © Alexandra Malmqvist

2.1. Corruption and integrity in the water sector

Corruption – one of the main obstacles to efficient, participatory and fair water governance – has many faces and meanings to different people. The generally accepted understanding of corruption is 'the misuse of entrusted power for private gain'. This is a broad definition encompassing a range of concrete practices, including:

- Bribes and kickbacks, often the most cited forms of corruption. They may include the payment of a fixed sum, a percentage of a contract or favours in-kind. For example, users may pay a small amount of money to speed up repairs or fake their meter reading and lower their bills. Equally, this can occur at higher levels within the chain of service provision.
- Fraud, based on manipulation or distortion of information for private gain, including the falsification of receipts and other documents.
- Favouritism, clientelism, cronyism and nepotism – the use of entrusted power to provide preferential treatment to friends, family, business partners, political parties etc. This form of corruption often goes beyond individual interest and may include attempts to realign power structures for the accumulation and maintenance of power, status and wealth. Thus, it represents the introduction of non-democratic methods for political and financial gain.
- Extortion – the use of coercion to force an action or induce complicity. It can include threats of violence or of exposing damaging information.
- Embezzlement and theft – the direct taking of public money or property for personal enrichment. Not all cases of theft are considered corrupt, as it depends who is being stolen from, and if entrusted power is being abused.

A distinction is commonly made between 'petty' and 'grand' corruption. The first is of a smaller and more decentralised nature, involving the exchange of smaller favours, and occurs on a fairly regular basis. The acts may be small on their own, but together their cumulative impact may be large. Grand corruption is of a more centralised nature, between higher-level actors, generally relating to large contracts, large sums of money, or significant potential power gains. The acts themselves do not occur as frequent as petty corruption, but each case may have a considerable impact on its own.

Why promote integrity instead of directly combating corruption?

TI's Global Corruption Report, 2008, states that corruption is at the core of the global water crisis, and therefore it is important to fight it. In the water sector, this is a challenging task that requires considerable political commitment and resources. Some important characteristics of corruption include:

1. It is generally practised in secret to avoid compromising evidence, and therefore is hard to detect. Legal authorities may also be involved which makes prosecution and conviction difficult.

2. It usually benefits actual people, but it hurts an abstract entity – the public. Someone who is deceived personally will be likely to react to this injustice, but for the public this is a more complex process.

3. It always involves power relations, which makes it difficult to discuss openly. In some countries this seems to be changing, and corruption may even become part of daily public debate. However, it still may be difficult, costly and even dangerous to engage in the pursuit of concrete corruption cases.

The assumption that underlies the AWIS is that the inherent difficulties of fighting corruption in the water sector can be circumvented by enhancing water integrity, thus reducing the opportunities for corruption. This is a positive approach which even 'corrupt' people can buy into, as there is no direct risk of prosecution. However, the singular focus on integrity is not sufficient, as it is often necessary to look at the entire situation. For example, if petty corruption takes place in a context of very low salaries and inefficient and complex registration, tackling corruption on its own will be costly and ineffective unless the whole system is dealt with at the same time. The challenge is to avoid or at least dramatically reduce corruption, so that fewer cases have to be taken to court.

Therefore, the AWIS explores the integrity of the water sector defined as practices impeding corruption and promoting respect for the rule of law. Rather than measuring direct indicators of corruption it reviews the checks and balances that are in place to reduce risks and opportunities for corruption. The scan looks at three dimensions of integrity – TAP – and makes an assessment of the ACF and ACM. [Visscher et al, 2010]

Overview of negative impacts of deficient integrity in the water sector [GCR, 2008]

The World Bank estimates that 20-40 per cent of water-sector finances are lost due to corrupt practices. Moreover, the ecosystem suffers, for example when bribes are paid to cover up the discharge of wastewater and to allow for excessive abstraction from rivers or groundwater resources. It may also mean water rights are given to powerful stakeholders, neglecting the needs of the poor.

Deficient integrity in water sector governance increases transaction costs and discourages investment in infrastructure. Investments are delayed, ineffective or not undertaken at all, and acquisitions in public procurement are overpriced, which in turn may lead to deficient infrastructure. Cronyism and favouritism may weaken the human resource base in the water sector by preventing qualified candidates from getting jobs.

At household level, corrupt practices may lead to deficient water service delivery, or even no service at all, for example when a family cannot afford to pay forced bribes. Generally speaking, a lack of integrity can result in poor water governance, which focuses on private gains rather than the public interest. Poor water governance hurts the poor the most and undermines a sustainable integrated water resource management.

Some factors that make integrity in the water sector, especially in service delivery, important include:

• The sector depends on a range of actors at different governance levels (national, regional, local) which complicates transparency and the effective co-ordination of responsibilities.
• The sector is very capital intensive and involves large amounts of public money. Extensive procurement processes for large and complex projects are difficult to standardise and control (internally and externally).
• Water service delivery is often carried out by a monopoly of public or private water companies. These require a high level of integrity to ensure cost effectiveness and a fair rate of return on the investment and effort of the actors involved. With growing water scarcity (due to population growth, economic development, etc) the relative value of water is likely to increase, which may make corrupt practices more profitable.
• In the sector there is a strong asymmetry of technical and financial information between users, providers and decision-makers. This puts economically poor users in an even more disadvantaged position and makes them more vulnerable to corruption.

2.2. Going beyond participatory sector-specific diagnostics

Pioneer developers of aggregated corruption measurements acknowledge the importance of country and sector-specific analyses [Kaufmann, 2002]. A more in-depth analysis of the water sector has already been made in Uganda and similar processes are underway in several other countries. The AWIS is one tool that may trigger such in-depth analysis, as a follow-up to the quick overview it generates (of potential areas of weakness in different water sub-sectors and of anti-corruption policies that are already in place). It also brings together sector actors so they

can identify concrete next steps. However, it is important to realise that the AWIS needs to be part of a broader process because, while it can give an overview of the situation, it cannot create change on its own. The scan should help to create action in those areas that have been identified as most critical and that have the potential for the greatest impact. This makes it very important for sector leaders to be closely involved in the scan, so they can embed the results in water sector improvement plans, ideally by working closely with civil society. The scan has been developed for national level, but can also be used at regional or even municipal level, which is particularly useful if the organisations at these levels act autonomously. It can even be implemented at project level (including external participants where appropriate), as it may help project staff to gain insight and highlight gaps in their sector understanding, and establish specific ACM for the project concerned.

2.3 AWIS sub-sectors

So far the AWIS has been applied to the context of urban and rural water supply and sanitation, but it can be easily adapted for use in other sub-sectors, such as water resource management, irrigation or hydropower. Each sector has its particular dynamics and actors (which sometimes overlap with other sectors), and these must be taken into account when a strategy to strengthen integrity is established and implemented.

This section provides a brief description of some of the challenges, actors and roles in urban and rural water supply and sanitation, where enhanced integrity can play a crucial role in supporting all those people in need of sustained access to drinking water and basic sanitation. Today, billions of people still fight a daily struggle just to have drinking water. In Africa, some 40 billion hours per year are spent collecting water, which is the same as the total hours worked in France every year. On the other hand, adequate sanitation facilities are crucial to help combat disease:

in Africa, 80 per cent of health problems are related to inadequate water supply and sanitation.

Urban water supply

More than half the world's population lives in ever-expanding cities, and this proportion is rising all the time. A substantial portion of the urban population in developing countries lacks access to improved sources of drinking water. Population growth and rampant urbanisation have put enormous pressure on water utilities to expand their services. Financial resources are often insufficient and spent ineffectively. As a consequence, more and more people in urban areas rely on informal service providers or get their water from wells and boreholes.

This reliance on informal water networks is partly due to colonial legacies (networks being set up to benefit the elite), but also because of poorly managed growth processes in ever faster growing cities [GCR, 2008]. In urban areas, informal settlements frequently lack connections to formal water networks as many households do not possess legal land titles. As a consequence many inhabitants depend on informal water providers, which are not regulated and often have no legal status. This creates a lot of uncertainty, both for providers and users, relating to rights and obligations, and may also create significant opportunities for corruption. What's more, the restrictions in water supply delivery, and in the overstretched water supply infrastructure, present important challenges to water integrity, as they generate further opportunities for corruption. The development of new infrastructure in urban areas entails large investment and complex procurement processes which open up yet more opportunities for corruption.

The types of actors involved in urban water supply are diverse. They include (among others): water supply utilities, regulatory authorities, small as well as large companies, district authorities, informal service providers and active civil society organisations. This diversity of stakeholders and the complex social and infrastructural context of urban areas is very challenging in terms of TAP. In many countries, policy and legislation for urban water supply is available – often as a result of sector reform – but its application, and the potential to influence decision-making, is much less established.

Rural water supply

Even though urban growth is high, in a number of countries the majority of people still live in rural settlements, few of which have a piped water supply. Many people depend on point water sources and may have to spend considerable time fetching drinking water from distant water points. The water is often poor quality, which results in numerous health problems. In many areas, these water sources may also be important for cattle and subsistence farming.

In rural areas, the infrastructure and public administration needed to deal with water supply are less complex than in cities. On the other hand, 'clientelist' systems (votes in exchange for favours) are usually more established and changes towards integrity and better water governance can be difficult. In small, closed communities, everybody knows each other, so changing behaviour and structures is more risky than in larger communities. Furthermore, civil society may be less organised in rural areas.

There are diverse challenges to the integrity of water supply in rural areas. These make it harder to overcome existing supply gaps. For example, the fact that many arrangements are made orally rather than in writing prevents transparency and makes it more difficult for outsiders (or marginalised groups) to participate in decision-making. Participants in the AWIS need to be well aware of the cultural context and the existing, complex social and power structures involved in rural water supply.

Urban sanitation

Urban sanitation – often defined as the collection, treatment and disposal of human waste – is a major problem in many developing countries. It has to meet the needs of a fast-growing population in a context characterised by very limited infrastructure and a fragmented governance system with unclear division of roles between different institutions. Challenges to the governance of urban sanitation are numerous, including: cost-intensive infrastructure; inaccessible and densely-populated low-income urban areas; pollution of ground and surface water sources; and uncontrolled reuse of (untreated) sewage for irrigation. Moreover, sanitation is low on the political agenda.

Responsibilities for urban sanitation are fragmented and divided between different levels (from household and district-level to national ministries). It is often not clear who makes what kind of decisions, nor how and by whom projects are financed. Many poor people lack access to improved sanitation facilities and are dependent on informal sanitation service provision, but sanitation policy often excludes these informal arrangements.

A substantial proportion of urban sanitation services and infrastructure is managed by the informal sector, outside official influence. At the same time, the formal urban sanitation sector is responsible for cost-intensive infrastructure projects involving different stakeholders and interests. This complex set-up gives room to various opportunities for corruption.

Rural sanitation

Though rural sanitation is important for people's health and well-being, it is still a low priority for rural policy-makers. In many rural areas, improved sanitation coverage levels are low, although the number of sanitation projects is growing – often focusing on low subsidy approaches, which can reduce opportunities for corruption. However, so far it seems that many projects are still not able to target the poorest

sections of society. Therefore, the integrity of rural sanitation needs close attention, not least because it involves a variety of different actors whose roles are often not clearly defined and may in fact overlap.

"It is important to realise that the AWIS needs to be part of a broader process"

3. Pillars of integrity

Water treatment: Part of an effort to rehabilitate the Pasig river, a sewage treatment plant was constructed in Marikina city (Phillipines) where waste water collected from residential and commercial establishment is treated and recycled. © Danilo Victoriano, finalist WIN photo competition 2011

In the AWIS, integrity broadly refers to an environment that evades corruption and enables good governance. This includes respect for the rule of law but also refers to rational, smart decisions and to a functioning and efficient water sector administration. In AWIS, integrity is based on three pillars: transparency, accountability and participation (TAP). There is a difficulty here, in that these terms have different meanings and are used differently by different people. The specific definitions adopted in the AWIS are shown in Table 1, and clarified below. In addition, the AWIS looks at the anti-corruption framework (ACF), both in terms of policy and legislation, and in its application.

3.1. TRANSPARENCY

The term transparency is often used to refer to the right of citizens to access publicly relevant information. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers'. Human rights organisations use this in their fight against corruption and stress that openness and public access to information are crucial for citizens to understand the decision-making processes that affect them, and to be knowledgeable about the standards to expect from public officials [Rehren, 2008].

Transparency International indicates that transparency can be defined as a principle that allows those affected by administrative decisions, business transactions or charitable work to know not only the basic facts and figures but also the mechanisms and processes. It is the duty of civil servants, managers and trustees to act visibly, predictably and understandably.

In the AWIS, however, the term is used differently. **Here, transparency is narrowly defined as relating to the existence of written procedures, agreements and contracts**, as these are considered to set the basis for actors' understanding of the rights and obligations that govern their relationships. This approach is based on the principle agent model of Huppert (2002). The access to information is taken out of transparency and is included in participation (see 3.3), as this makes it much easier to assess the situation.

3.2. ACCOUNTABILITY

Accountability is a broad concept which involves several dimensions and is often used in different ways. Some see it as a mechanism to hold people and institutions accountable, whereas others may see it as a concept referring to the actual application and implementation of rules and standards. In a democratic sense, according to SIWI (2011), accountability means that an individual in a public function or a public institution must answer for their actions. They suggest that there are three dimensions of accountability:

- Political accountability means that the government must be accountable to the citizens of a country, and that it must not abuse its power. This also implies that the appointment of specific individuals to various decision-making positions must be justified based on objective criteria, and the individuals and their departments must account for their activities and spending in transparent ways.
- Administrative accountability refers to accountability within administrative structures and standards. This includes regular evaluation and necessary improvements, and ensuring that all bureaucrats, consultants and technical personnel comply with professional codes of conduct and professional standards. Increasingly, public and private service providers are required to produce annual reports of their planning, performance and spending.
- Financial accountability refers to individuals and institutions who must truthfully and accurately document the intended and actual use of resources allocated to them. It may also require that individuals with discretionary powers account for their earnings through a programme of assets declaration.

One can also differentiate between long-term and short-term accountability. In the long-term process of accountability, citizens engage in different ways of holding politicians responsible for their actions. In the most classical sense they can do this by voting, but other more indirect mechanisms also serve this end. A critical public debate on important decisions is evidence of an improved accountability, over and above the possibility of voting every couple of years. Short-term accountability refers to the empowerment of citizens so that they can influence service providers directly. This is also referred to as 'client or citizen power'. That is to say, accountability refers to the system through which public and private entities are held responsible for their actions.

In the AWIS context, **accountability relates to the way in which written procedures and agreements are being applied and, where feasible, the potential compliance of the actors involved**. This assumes that, if procedures and agreements are clear, actors involved can hold each other accountable, also known as 'internal accountability'.

3.3. Participation

Participation has many different meanings. Some stress that it refers to the most basic indication of democratic rule; that whoever is affected by a decision should, one way or another, directly or indirectly, have the chance of intervening in and influencing it. It is also argued that participation fosters ownership in the sense that decisions are increasingly accepted and implemented by the involved actors. Studies show that actors affected by decisions and involved in the decision-making process tend to respect decisions more than those who are excluded from such processes.Participation can also portrayed as important for public institutions and service providers, as it enables them to better understand the needs and interests of the public and consumers.

In the AWIS context, participation relates to the ability of the public, **the users or their representatives (including marginalised and resource-poor groups) to access information, influence decision-making, file complaints effectively and be heard**. It can be best seen as external accountability – through a third party – which avoids collusion among specific actors within a sub-sector.

The rational is that without access to good quality information (that can be checked by independent third parties) stakeholders are not aware of what is going on. But availability of information on its own is not sufficient; it also needs to be easily accessible to all stakeholders. In addition, mechanisms must exist so that users can file complaints or protest. Another crucial aspect concerns the way they can influence decisions.

3.4. Anti-corruption framework

In the initial application of the AWIS, anti-corruption measures were included as a fourth pillar for the analysis. These were defined as the specific measures organisations and governments take internally and externally to reduce the risk of corruption, including the application of sanctions where appropriate. These measures often turned out to be more generic. This resulted in repetition and overlap in participants' annotations.

Based on this experience it was considered useful to establish an overview of the overall anti-corruption framework that applies to the sub-sector, in terms of policy and legislation and its active application. Most of this framework will be overarching and not sector-specific, as it relates to how areas such as public procurement regulation, public financial administration, freedom of information and whistle-blowers protection are organised and implemented. This sets the context for improving sector integrity

and thus the AWIS needs to explore this framework, assess the presence of an active press publishing about corruption, and understand the way civil society is involved. To reflect this, the initial AWIS model was adjusted to include an assessment of the integrity of the anti-corruption framework (see 4.5).

In this context it is important to look at some anti-corruption measures that are being taken. The examples in Annex 1 show that some of the efforts are of a more general nature, but others relate to the development of sector-specific anti-corruption tools, such as 'integrity pacts' (TI and WIN, 2010) between, for example, the producers of water pipes or organisations that are participating in the bidding process.

Table 1: Definition of the pillars of integrity used in AWIS

Pillars of integrity	Explanation
Transparency	The existence of written procedures, agreements and contracts that explain the roles and responsibilities of actors.
Accountability	The application of the written procedures and agreements and, where feasible, the potential compliance of actors (this is known as 'internal accountability').
Participation	The ability of the public, and the users or their representatives (including marginalised and resource-poor groups), to access information, influence decision-making, file complaints effectively and be heard ('external accountability').

Queue for life - Slum dwellers, in Kolkata city of India who don't have access to a separate supply, are queueing to collect water for daily use from the roadside tap arranged by the local municipality. © Rajat Kumar Das, finalist WIN photo competition 2011

4. Applying TAP to critical risk areas

In the AWIS, several critical areas have been selected for the integrity (TAP) assessment. The five main risk areas that have been established are shown in Table 2. For each of these areas some further explanation about the application of TAP is provided.

For each risk area, three different integrity levels (1 = low, 2 = medium and 3 = high) are used to score performance regarding transparency, accountability and participation. At a later stage the scores are used as the basis to generate more comprehensive, qualitative information through an annotation process (see 5.2.3). The lowest level will require the greatest attention, and priority setting will be needed to explore the significance of a specific risk area and the cost-benefit ratio of possible measures.

> "the scores are used as the basis to generate more comprehensive, qualitative information through an annotation process"

TABLE 2: THE MAIN RISK AREAS USED IN THE AWIS

Policy and legislation	Comprises the official policy and legislation that is in place in the specific sub-sector.
Regulation	Refers to the existence and application of concrete rules (water rights allocation, tariffs, quality standards, service standards, abstraction rates, etc) and the existence and active operation of institutions (oversight bodies, water resources commissions or equivalents).
Investment projects and programmes	Concerns how the financial resources in the specific sub-sector are being spent and how the institutions involved are being controlled.
Service provision	Concerns how services are being provided and how respective institutions are being controlled.
Anti-corruption legislation	Refers to the overarching anti-corruption framework that applies to the sub-sector that is being reviewed, looking at the specific anti-corruption (policy and) legislation that is in place (in a specific country) and its application.

4.1 POLICY AND LEGISLATION (PL)

Policy and legislation (PL) refers to the official policies and laws that are in place in the specific sub-sectors. It is the overall framework that aligns the main activities in the sub-sector. In AWIS, we look at whether policy and legislation is in place and being implemented, whether it is comprehensive, pro-poor and gender sensitive, and whether complaints can be filed and weaknesses remedied in a fair way.

Transparency in policy and legislation is defined as the existence and availability of policy and legislation. So it is not about whether the process that was used to develop the policy is transparent, but whether the policy and legislation for the sub-sector is comprehensive, clear and available in writing, and is pro-poor and gender-sensitive (see Table 3).

Accountability in policy and legislation concerns the implementation of policies and laws, and the strength of the institutions involved (see Table 4).

Participation in policy and legislation relates to the access stakeholders have to information about policy and legislation and other areas, for example progress with plans for the sub-sector. Furthermore, it relates to the way stakeholders can express their views, complain or influence decision-making (see Table 5).

"Policy and legislation (PL) refers to the official policies and laws that are in place in the specific sub-sectors."

TABLE 3: THE TRANSPARENCY LEVELS IN POLICY AND LEGISLATION

T: PL=1	PL does not exist or is very limited and lacks clarity.
T: PL=2	PL is developed but has important gaps; for example, it may not favour the poor or it may not include legal mechanisms for users to take judiciary action against a water provider for poor service.
T: PL=3	The existing PL is well established and is pro-poor and gender sensitive. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 4: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEVELS IN POLICY AND LEGISLATION

A: PL=1	PL does not exist or is very limited and lacks clarity.
A: PL=2	The existing PL is partly applied, but with important limitations – for example, the institutions are weak or cases of preferential treatment exist. Ministries are not establishing some of the by-laws that are needed and subsidies are not well targeted. The policy may indicate a pro-poor approach but in practice the situation is very different, for example piped supplies to higher income groups are subsidised.
A: PL=3	The existing PL is applied in a comprehensive way and institutional roles are properly implemented. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 5: THE PARTICIPATION LEVELS IN POLICY AND LEGISLATION

P: PL=1	Information about PL and the way it is developed is not available or very difficult to obtain. Stakeholders have no complaint mechanisms and can at best influence decisions through elections (being the most basic influence on policy making).
P: PL=2	Information is available on PL and the way it is developed but may not be sufficiently independent or verifiable, and access may not be equal for all stakeholders. Stakeholders can express their views and complaint mechanisms exist. Powerful stakeholders may be able to exert influence through lobby groups, which may have resulted in biased legislation.
P: PL=3	Stakeholders have good access to information that can be checked and have access to adequate complaint mechanisms. They are actively consulted on important topics, taking into account civil society as well as poverty and gender issues, or are properly represented in decision-making bodies. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

4.2 REGULATION (R)

Regulation (R) concerns the concrete rules and instruments that exist to operationalise policy and legislation, and whether these rules are implemented by independent institutions. Looking at different sub-sectors, rules may include water rights allocation, water tariff setting and water quality standards. Institutions may include oversight bodies such as the regulator or water resources commission.

Transparency in regulation refers to the availability of written regulations, and the existence of a clear, defined distribution of competences among different regulatory actors (see Table 6).

Accountability in regulation refers to how regulation is being implemented and whether regulatory institutions are independent. The rationale is that a good regulatory framework has little impact if it is not properly implemented by independent institutions with sufficient resources (see Table 7).

Participation in regulation relates to the access of information about the process and results of regulation, the existence of complaint mechanisms and the degree of stakeholder consultation in the regulation process (see Table 8).

"Regulation (R) concerns the concrete rules and instruments that exist to operationalise policy and legislation, and whether these rules are implemented by independent institutions."

TABLE 6: THE TRANSPARENCY LEVELS IN REGULATION

T: R=1	Regulation is not in place or is very limited and no or few regulatory institutions are in place.
T: R=2	A good number of regulations exist but still have important gaps. For example, regulation may not favour the poor or may not cover some actors (eg, in the informal sector), or tariff regulations are not clear about how to deal with inefficient water provision.
T: R=3	The existing regulation is well established, pro-poor and gender sensitive. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 7: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEVELS IN REGULATION

A: R=1	Regulation is hardly (or not) applied and the institutions that are supposed to implement it are very weak, are not independent and have no resources to do their work.
A: R=2	The existing regulation is partly applied, but with important limitations in that (sections of) the institutions are weak and have limited internal controls or anti-corruption measures in place.
A: R=3	The existing regulation is applied in a comprehensive way. Institutional roles are properly implemented and have solid internal controls and anti-corruption measures in place. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 8: THE PARTICIPATION LEVELS IN REGULATION

P: R=1	Information about regulation and the way it is developed and applied is not available or is very difficult to obtain. Stakeholders have no complaint mechanisms and cannot influence regulation.
P: R=2	Information is available about regulation and the way it is developed and applied. However, it may not be sufficiently independent or verifiable, and access may not be equal for all stakeholders. For example, water tariffs may be published by the regulator on the internet but there may not be information about the way these have been established. Stakeholders can express their views and complaint mechanisms exist. However, powerful stakeholders may exert influence through lobby groups, which may result in biased regulation.
P: R=3	Stakeholders have good access to information that can be verified and to adequate complaint mechanisms. They are actively consulted on important topics, taking into account civil society and poverty and gender issues, or are properly represented in decision-making bodies. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

4.3 INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES (IPP)

Investment projects and programmes may vary considerably between and within sub-sectors. In urban water supply development, projects may be heavily influenced by development banks and big, multinational companies with high levels of technical expertise and complex governing structures. This would make it especially difficult for civil society to monitor their actions. For rural water supply a different but equally complex picture may exist, where procurement processes are decentralised and managed by less experienced staff, and where few local actors are involved in competitive bidding.

Ensuring the integrity of investment programmes is very important as it can greatly contribute to their efficiency and effectiveness, thus making it possible to reach out to more people with the resources available.

Transparency in investment projects and programmes refers to the availability of written rules for the design of projects and procurement processes (including tender review committees), as well as audit and evaluation procedures (see Table 9). This also includes the anti-corruption measures (including codes of conducts and integrity pacts) of the institutions involved.

Accountability in investment projects and programmes concerns whether design rules, procurement processes and audits are being implemented and the extent to which they involve independent institutions such as an ombudsman. It also refers to the application of anti-corruption measures in participating organisations (see Table 10).

Participation in investment projects and programmes relates to whether stakeholders have access to reliable information about investment projects and procurement processes. Furthermore, it refers to available complaint mechanisms and the involvement of stakeholders in monitoring and decision-making (see Table 11).

"Ensuring the integrity of investment programmes is very important as it can greatly contribute to their efficiency and effectiveness"

TABLE 9: THE TRANSPARENCY LEVELS IN INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

T: IPP=1	No or very few clear rules are available in writing, or they only apply to very few investment projects or programmes.
T: IPP=2	Rules for project design, procurement and technical and financial audits are fairly well established but are not sufficiently clear or still have important gaps. For example, rules may not favour the poor or may not cover some actors (eg, in the informal sector), or they may not allow for the exclusion of bidders that have a track record of illegal practice. Also, only some ACM may be available in participating institutions.
T: IPP=3	The existing design rules are well established, pro-poor and gender sensitive; procurement regulations and ACM are solid; independent audits are requested and comparative performance results will be analysed (benchmarking). Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 10: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEVELS IN INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

A: IPP=1	Design rules, procurement regulation and technical and financial audits are not (or are poorly) applied; controlling institutions are very weak and not independent; ACM are not really applied.
A: IPP=2	Design rules, procurement regulation and technical and financial audits are implemented but with limitations, for example they may be applied by weak institutions with no ACM. So staff may be laid off for breaching the code of conduct in some companies but not others. Effective benchmarking among different projects is not taking place.
A: IPP=3	Design rules, procurement regulation and technical and financial audits are well applied and are controlled by independent institutions. ACM are applied in a comprehensive way by the organisations involved. Benchmarking is used as a control mechanism as well as a tool to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of investments. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 11: THE PARTICIPATION LEVELS IN INVESTMENT PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

P: IPP=1	Information about investment projects and programmes, including the way they are developed, procured and audited, is not available or is very difficult to obtain. Stakeholders have no complaint mechanisms and cannot exert influence.
P: IPP=2	Information is available about investment projects and programmes. However, this information may not be sufficiently independent or verifiable, and access may not be equal for all. Stakeholders have complaint mechanisms and can express their views, but may not be able to influence decisions.
P: IPP=3	Stakeholders have adequate complaint mechanisms and good access to information that can be checked. They may be involved in monitoring the implementation of investment projects and programmes and are actively consulted on important topics, taking into account civil society and poverty and gender issues, or are properly represented in decision-making bodies. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

4.4 Service provision (SP)

Water service provision concerns the daily delivery of water by different service providers, including both formal and informal providers. Specifically, service provision relates to the daily routines of these providers. It is important to recognise that different types of service providers exist, including public or private water companies, water committees, water users' associations and informal water vendors. In cases where both the formal and informal sector have an important role in service provision, it may be better to do a separate assessment for each sector.

Transparency in service provision refers to whether the rights and obligations of formal and informal providers and users exist in a written form (contracts), and whether they are easily available and understandable to users and potential users. It also relates to the rules that govern providers in relation to their supervisory bodies, and whether these rules are easily accessible (see Table 12).

Accountability in service provision refers to the implementation of the rules governing the services that are being provided, specifically as they relate to rights and obligations. It also refers to whether comparative technical and financial audits are being implemented among providers (benchmarking) (see Table 13).

Participation in service provision relates to whether stakeholders have easy access to reliable information about the performance of the providers; whether reliable and effective complaint mechanisms exist (including the possibility of taking legal action for inadequate service); and the involvement of stakeholders in monitoring and decision-making (see Table 14).

"Water service provision concerns the daily delivery of water by different service providers"

TABLE 12: THE TRANSPARENCY LEVELS IN SERVICE PROVISION

T: SP=1	No or very few clear rules are available in writing for the different service providers and users.
T: SP=2	Rules for service provision are fairly well established but are not sufficiently clear, do not apply to all providers or have important gaps. For example, rules may not favour the poor or may not cover some actors (eg. in the informal sector), or providers may not have procurement rules or ACM.
T: SP=3	The existing rules are well established and are pro-poor and gender sensitive; procurement, audit rules and performance indicators are clear; and organisations have established written ACM. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 13: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEVELS IN SERVICE PROVISION

A: SP=1	No or few rules (such as technical and financial audits) are applied; controlling institutions are very weak and not independent; and ACM are not really applied.
A: SP=2	Technical and financial audits are applied but not by all providers; supervisory bodies need strengthening; and the application of ACM can be more intensive. In some institutions measures are taken against staff who breach codes of conduct. Effective benchmarking among different providers is not taking place.
A: SP=3	Technical and financial audits are well applied to all providers and are controlled by independent institutions. ACM are applied in a comprehensive way by the organisations involved. Benchmarking is used as a control mechanism as well as a tool to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of investments. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 14: THE PARTICIPATION LEVELS IN SERVICE PROVISION

P: SP=1	Stakeholders have no or very little access to information about service provision, such as the technical and financial performance of providers. Stakeholders have no complaint mechanisms and cannot influence service provision.
P: SP=2	Information is available about service provision, including the technical and financial performance of providers. However, this information may not be sufficiently independent or verifiable, and access may not be equal for all. Stakeholders can express their views and complaint mechanisms exist (though they may not be very effective), and users may not be able to influence decisions.
P: SP=3	Stakeholders have adequate complaint mechanisms and have good access to information that can be checked. They may be: involved in monitoring performance; actively consulted on important topics, taking into account civil society, and poverty and gender issues; or properly represented in decision-making bodies. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

4.5 Anti-corruption legislation (ACL)

This section concerns the overarching anti-corruption framework that applies to the sub-sector that is being reviewed, looking at the anti-corruption (policy and) legislation and how it is being implemented (see sections 3.4). This is not about specific anti-corruption measures that are being implemented by organisations, as these have already been included in the analysis presented in previous sections (particularly 4.3 and 4.4).
Most ACL will be overarching and not sector-specific, as it relates to how areas such as public procurement regulation, public financial administration, freedom of information and the protection of whistle-blowers are organised and implemented.

Transparency in anti-corruption legislation (ACL) relates to the availability of written legislation, and whether responsibilities and procedures are clearly defined and documented. Available ACL may not be well established, for example if low fines are applied for illegal acts that have high potential gains. Or it may apply to the public sector but not to the private or informal sector (see Table 15).

Accountability in anti-corruption legislation concerns the implementation of legislation to tackle corruption; how the legislation is implemented in the specific sub-sector; and the capacity and independence of the institutions responsible for its implementation (see Table 16).

Participation in anti-corruption legislation is related to: the access of information about the legislation and its implementation in the specific sub-sector; the role of responsible agencies, the free press and civil society; and the extent to which stakeholders can express their views, complain and influence decision-making (see Table 17).

"This section concerns the overarching anti-corruption framework that applies to the sub-sector [...] looking at anti-corruption (policy) and legislation"

TABLE 15: THE TRANSPARENCY LEVELS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND ITS APPLICATION

| T: ACL=1	Anti-corruption legislation does not exist or is very limited and lacks clarity.
T: ACL=2	Anti-corruption legislation is developed but has important gaps; for example it may be very dated and include fines that have no relation to potential gains, or it may apply to public services and not to the private sector, or may not include the protection of whistle blowers.
T: ACL=3	The existing anti-corruption legislation is well established, includes freedom of information and protection of whistle blowers, and is relevant in terms of fines. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 16: THE ACCOUNTABILITY LEVELS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND ITS APPLICATION

A: ACL=1	Anti-corruption legislation is not, or barely, applied in the sub-sector. The institutions that are supposed to implement the legislation are very weak, are not independent and have no resources to do their work.
A: ACL =2	The existing anti-corruption legislation is partly applied in the sub-sector, but still with important limitations. For example, the institutions may be weak or there may be cases of preferential treatment. A limited number of cases are brought to justice, fines that are given are low, whistle blowers are not well protected, the press does not publish cases and civil society action is limited.
A: ACL =3	The existing anti-corruption legislation is applied in a comprehensive way, institutional roles are properly implemented, the press publishes cases, and whistle blowers have reasonable protection. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

TABLE 17: THE PARTICIPATION LEVELS IN ANTI-CORRUPTION LEGISLATION AND ITS APPLICATION

P: ACL=1	Information about anti-corruption legislation and the way it is implemented is not available or is very difficult to obtain. Corruption cases are not recorded, and stakeholders (including civil society organisations) have no real influence.
P: ACL =2	Information is available on anti-corruption legislation and the way it is implemented but has important gaps and is not sufficiently independent. Some cases of corruption may be reported but the press may not be free to investigate and whistle blowers may not be sufficiently protected. Stakeholders can express their views and complaint mechanisms exist, but institutions are not fully independent and may be influenced by powerful stakeholders. Civil society may not be very active.
P: ACL =3	Access to independent information on anti-corruption legislation is well established and corruption cases are filed and properly dealt with. Institutions are active and work with civil society. Press is free and whistle blowers are protected. Situation is quite satisfactory and may only require limited improvement.

Part B: Implementation guide

These people are called visti. They carry pure water in leather pouches which can contain gallons of water that quenches the thirst of people. In India we believe that quenching thirst gives us blessings and these vistis are living their life with the blessings of thirsty people. **Kolkata, India** © Supriya Biswas, finalist WIN photo competition 2011

5. Application methodology of the AWIS

LIfe on the river, Bangladesh. © Janek Hermann-Friede

This section provides guidance on the organisation, preparation and implementation of an AWIS workshop, describes each step of the process, and makes suggestions for follow-up (see Figure1).

AWIS is a participatory tool which promotes constructive dialogue between central stakeholders through a workshop. The

facilitation of this workshop is important as stakeholders may hold different and opposing positions that could lead to confrontation (with potential winners and losers). The facilitator should enable dialogue to encourage a common understanding. This can form the basis for shared solutions of the most important problems.

The AWIS workshop itself comprises the following steps:

- Introduction and explanation of AWIS methodology and scoring.
- Anonymous scoring of the TAP levels of the five critical areas:
  o The scores need to be processed by the facilitator to obtain averages for each of the TAP levels in the five critical areas.
  o The average scores are shared with participants as the basis for establishing collective annotations.
- Providing annotations:
  o As a group, participants establish a fair description of the level below the average score, and thereafter they give the arguments for the level above the score. This is done for each indicator.
  o After the annotation process participants can do another round of anonymous scoring, as they may have gained a better understanding of the situation.
- Discussion of results and follow-up:
  o Participants analyse the results of the AWIS and identify critical areas.
  o Participants agree follow-up and define tasks and responsibilities.

Preparation
» Secure funding & resources
» Have material available
» Establish team & select facilitator
» Identify stakeholders
» Provide input on issues of water integrity
» Fix venue & date

AWIS workshop

Recommended/potential accompanying measures during the process
» Explore possibility of MoU with participants & donors
» Provide feedback to community of practice

Follow-up
» Validate draft report with participants
» Provide final report
» Consolidate wider group & get feedback
» Develop an action plan
» Publish findings
» Follow-up AWIS session

Figure 1: Overview of the AWIS process

- The scores, annotations, discussion points and follow-up need to be properly documented.

The resulting report is then shared with a wider group of stakeholders for validation and to create proper follow-up.

5.1. Organising the AWIS

5.1.1. Initiation
One organisation needs to take the lead and establish a small team to organise the process and ensure that experienced facilitators are available for the workshop. This team should carefully review this manual and the notes that are available for facilitators, and then consider whether adaptation to the local context is needed. They should also think through how the AWIS can be embedded in a wider process of sector improvement.

5.1.2. Establishing country-specific information
The collection of country-specific information is a good start for the AWIS as it helps to identify the more important sub-sectors where investments are being made and therefore may help to set priorities. As the AWIS is a quick scan, the basic information collected is kept very limited (as shown in Table 18). Often the desire is to collect more information, but this is better done after the AWIS has given an overview of the situation and, hopefully, shown where important gaps exist.

5.1.3. Selection of participants
The AWIS team will need to select potential participants in consultation with key institutions that may use the results to improve the situation. Visiting some of these institutions and sharing information about the process may be a good way to initiate discussion.

It is essential that the group of participants remains relatively small (approximately eight to twelve for a sub-sector) and is sufficiently diverse to ensure that together they have a good understanding of the respective sub-sector and the anti-corruption legislation. With good facilitation a somewhat larger group (up to 15) can also be accommodated. Keeping the group small is important to facilitate the discussion and keep costs down. Yet they need to have different disciplines and together should be able to cover the views of most stakeholders. Participants may include sector specialists and informed individuals from government, regulatory authorities, private sector, NGOs and civil society.

This expert group should then provide quick advice to the main sector stakeholders, who will then validate the results and use them for further action.

5.1.4. Preparation of the AWIS workshop
Participants have to be officially invited (see Annex 2 for an example invitation letter), ideally by the organisation that is the formal leader of the specific sub-sector. This letter should include a flyer with a brief description of the AWIS and its objectives, and an agenda (see Annex 3). The team needs to ensure invitations are sent out early enough in order to be able to find replacements if stakeholders cannot participate. High-ranking public officials and company representatives in particular will need to be notified as early as possible. After receiving confirmation, participants will need a briefing package which should include:

- A clear description of the workshop objectives and the follow-up process
- The AWIS manual
- Country and sub-sector specific information (see Table 18).

5.2 IMPLEMENTATION

5.2.1 INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATION

The workshop should start with a welcome, potentially by a sector leader. After the participants introduce themselves, the facilitator will need to explain the AWIS methodology. This session should include a short example from another sector, for example water resources management, so as not to influence the analysis of the specific sub-sector. This should be followed by a question-and-answer session to ensure that all participants understand the process and the objectives.

5.2.2 ANONYMOUS SCORING

Participants are asked to give scores for transparency, accountability and participation in each of the five critical areas of the respective AWIS sub-sector. Scoring is anonymous and individual, to ensure that participants do not influence each other. This is also a good way to ensure that participants follow their own opinion, even if this is critical and perhaps may be felt as criticism by others. This will help prevent participants scoring according to social expectations –

that is, to say the situation seems better or worse than they actually think it is. This issue may need some discussion before real scoring is done by participants. Participants may write notes in the support sheets they have received with the TAP tables for the five critical areas (see Annex 4). However, these notes are strictly for themselves and are not to be handed in.

The scoring scale has three main levels (1 to 3) which correspond with the tables in sections 4.1 to 4.5. The lowest level 1 implies that considerable improvement is needed. The highest level 3 implies that the situation is satisfactory and only limited improvement is needed.

The scoring also allows participants to score at intermediate levels, thus giving them in total five options (see Table 19). If a participant is not sufficiently familiar with a specific critical area, then they can leave the score blank. It will be useful to provide the participants with summary tables (presented in Annex 4). They can use these to add notes and write scores during the workshop. Participants will also receive the separate score card (see Annex 5) where they will

TABLE 18: GENERAL COUNTRY INFORMATION

Population (urban/rural)	... million; (Urban ..% Rural ..%)
Surface area	.... km2
GDP (PPP) 2008	US$ .... (country ranking: .....)
Water availability (m3/person/year)	.... m3/capita (......)
Water distribution (WS, industry, agriculture)	WS ....%; Industry ....%; Agriculture ...%
Water supply coverage (total/urban/rural)	Gen. .....%, urban ....%, rural ....%
Sanitation coverage (total/urban/rural)	Gen. .....%, urban ....%, rural ....%
Projected annual investment water sector	> US$ ...... million/yr .
Irrigated area of land	...... ha (some ....% of potential area)
Projected annual investment in irrigation	. > US$ ...... million/yr .
Electricity production from dams	...... MW (Megawatt)
Projected investment in hydraulic projects	US$ ...... million, short-term

enter their scores (anonymously) before they hand it to the facilitator.

The scoring is perception-based and therefore indicative and not really suited for quantitative comparisons between different countries or regions. Together with the annotations, the scores are meant to give an insight into the situation which can easily be shared and which provides a basis for action to improve integrity in a given sub-sector.

Once the participants have given scores for the indicators, the scores have to be processed immediately (in the first coffee break) to serve as input for the remaining workshop. The scores are entered into a pre-designed Excel template which will generate the averages (total number of scores per theme divided by the number of scores) and standard deviations (see Annex 6). The Excel template lists participants (1 to x) on the vertical axis and the themes on the horizontal axis. Participants who have not scored a specific indicator are not considered during the calculation of the respective average value. If the facilitation team has the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), it can also do the assessment of the consistency of the data by calculating the Crombach scores. Examples of the results of an AWIS are presented in Figure 2 and in Table 20.

5.2.3 PROVIDING ANNOTATIONS
The results of the scoring are presented to the participants and the challenging annotation process starts. The first score is taken for, say, transparency in urban water supply policy and legislation (PL). If the score is, for example, 2.4, then it is obvious that some participants have given a score of 2 or lower and others have given a score of 2.5 or higher. The participants will first be asked to collectively provide annotations for scoring level 2 (ie, PL is partly developed, but has important gaps). So the annotation may briefly mention what is in place and what important gaps exist.

This is a collective dialogue approach based on the 'Bono hat system' developed by de Bono (1985). In this approach, all participants talk from the same 'hat' (way of thinking or point of view), and then from another 'hat'. The assumption in this case is that all participants will only provide arguments to defend that the level is closer to two. So no one can say: "yes, but it's not 2 it's 3".


Figure 2: An example of the AWIS scores

TABLE 19: OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SCORE THE AWIS LEVELS

Score level	Related %
1	< 20%
1.5	20-40%
2	40-60%
2.5	60-80%
3	< 80%

When some good annotations have been provided, participants will be asked about arguments to explain why the score would be closer to 3. Participants should not present and defend their own position, and therefore do not need to confront each other. Instead, together they find reasons for the scenarios above and below the score in something similar to an academic exercise. Some example annotations from the first applications of the AWIS are presented in Box 2. An example of the different level annotations for TAP in one critical area is also provided (see Table 21).

The annotations should be documented, preferably on a flip chart or screen, together with the obtained score. Some of the detailed reasoning may also be documented and kept for the report. It may take participants a little while to grasp this part of the approach in the AWIS and to get used to collective reasoning instead of defending their own position.

At the end of the discussion of the TAPs in all five areas, participants can re-score all of them anonymously. Results can be calculated and possible differences briefly discussed. In an earlier AWIS test, some participants adjusted their scores based on improved insight, but the overall picture did not change because some increased and others decreased their scores.

5.2.4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND FOLLOW-UP

An overall picture will emerge as a result of the analysis, and may already indicate areas for action. But the score levels in the AWIS by themselves do not indicate what the most urgent problems are. This will require further information, including sector priorities. For example, if TAP is low both in service provision and in investment projects but a major investment programme is being developed, TAP in investment projects may need to be tackled immediately. This will usually require the involvement of a wider group of stakeholders, but workshop participants may already be able to give some suggestions. These will then become a useful input into the wider discussion with other stakeholders. This discussion may also include ideas about using the AWIS as a monitoring tool. The group may decide to share the results with a larger group of stakeholders for feedback first, and then move to a discussion about necessary activities to improve integrity.

Participants need to agree on the follow-up and define tasks and responsibilities before the end of the workshop. This may include agreements about:

- Providing feedback to the report
- Dissemination of the final results
- Presentation of the results to a ministry or other public entity
- Possible follow-up meeting(s).

At the end of the workshop, participants should also reflect on the AWIS methodology, as WIN is always looking into how it can be further improved.

TABLE 20: EXAMPLE OF AWIS SCORES FOR URBAN WATER SUPPLY (UWS)

#	Item	Transparency	Accountability	Participation
1	UWS policy and legislation	1.90 (0.46)	1.45 (0.37)	1.50 (0.47)
2	UWS regulation	1.80 (0.42)	1.35 (0.47)	1.25 (0.35)
3	UWS investment projects	2.00 (0.47)	1.85 (0.34)	1.45 (0.55)
4	UWS service delivery	1.90 (0.46)	1.55 (0.55)	1.55 (0.50)
5	ACL and application	1.20 (0.35)	1.20 (0.35)	1.10 (0.32)

Scores are the means with standard deviation in brackets; number of participants N = 12

5.2.5 FOLLOW-UP

After the workshop, the facilitator, rapporteur or one of the group members should put together the workshop report. The report includes a short note on AWIS, a brief evaluation of the composition of participants, the results (including all annotations), the possible suggestions from participants and the agreed follow-up (see outline in Annex 7). The report should be sent to the participants for validation and comment. This verification process is an important step to avoid misinterpretation and create acceptance for the report.

According to the follow-up procedure – defined by the participants during the workshop – further steps may need to be taken (for example, the distribution or presentation of the report to a wider audience).

5.3. AWIS AS A POTENTIAL MONITORING TOOL

As mentioned in chapter 1, the intention is to see if the AWIS can serve as a monitoring tool, by repeating it annually or every two years, for example. This is only of interest if concrete activities are being undertaken to improve the integrity of the specific sub-sector. The idea is repeated AWIS sessions with progress monitoring of the improvement activities proposed.

Invite the same participants for the second AWIS would be interesting, but this may not be feasible or even necessary. All participants in the second AWIS can start with the anonymous scoring, and then use the earlier annotations as a basis for revised ones. Participants should determine whether change has occurred, and then engage in a brief discussion about whether this is due to real changes or perhaps a misreading of the situation in the previous AWIS. In case of real changes, a brief reflection on the possible reasons and driving forces behind the change-process would be useful. This approach is likely to allow for a quicker process, thus freeing time to review the results of implemented improvement actions.

BOX 2: EXAMPLE ANNOTATIONS (TAKEN FROM EARLIER AWIS)

Inappropriate annotations

• Policy and legislation is in place but is not very well established.

This annotation is not specific enough. A reader who has not participated in the process will not know what part of the policy is established and where the gaps are. What legislation is in place and what is lacking?

• Awareness is created but there is inadequate consultation and feedback.

This annotation also lacks specificity as the potential actors are not clear.

Good annotations

• In 13 out of the 16 river basins, there are problems with complaint mechanisms and the consultation process.

• Filing complaints is cumbersome as it can only be done at one location and involves considerable paper work.

• Institutions are weak because they have a high turnover of district staff and new members of staff are not fully informed of the process.

• Industry, communities, district assemblies, civil society and NGOs are consulted through public meetings.

• Anti-corruption legislation applies to public sector but not to private sector and is out-of-date because the maximum fines are much too low compared with possible gains.

TABLE 21: EXAMPLE OF ANNOTATIONS OF DIFFERENT SCORING LEVELS ADJUSTED FROM INITIAL AWIS

	Urban water supply: policy and legislation (PL)		
Item	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
T	1 = PL very limited and lacks clarity.		• *Could not be supported.*
	2 = PL partly developed but with important gaps.		• Policy is in place but is not very well established as it doesn't take into account the role of the informal sector and doesn't clearly establish priority intervention areas. • Legislation does not allow for an independent regulator, as board members are elected and nominated by the president
	3 = PL well established (pro-poor and gender sensitive). Perhaps few improvements needed.	2.5	• Policy is in place and includes a pro-poor approach. • Legislation covers the formal providers which is fine if informal providers are abolished or legalised. • Regulator is established as independent entity.
A	1 = PL hardly or not at all applied with few institutions fulfilling their role.	1.9	• Policy and legislation is not actively applied. • Investments do not prioritise the poor. • Institutions are understaffed and under-resourced.
	2 = PL applied to a fair extent but still with important limitations, and (sections of the) institutions are weak.		• Policy and legislation is partly applied and pro-poor projects are being developed with donor support. • Piped systems still subsidised and do not benefit poor. • Institutions are developing their capacities but require more resources. However, ministry has recently been reorganised and is improving its ACM.
	3 = PL applied to a large extent and institutions are fit for their role and ACM in place. At best few improvements needed.		• *Could not be supported.*
P	1 = Stakeholders have very little access to information on PL.	1.8	• Policy and legislation is officially published but not readily available on the website. • Annual stakeholder meetings are held but consultation does not seem to lead to effective change.
	2 = Stakeholders have access to information, are informed and can express their views / complain, but access is biased towards certain actors.		• PL information can be accessed through the ministry for payment. • Annual stakeholder meetings and separate meetings with the donor community in order to agree on sector policies. • Filing complaints only through parliament.
	3 = Stakeholders are actively consulted (pro-poor and gender sensitive) and/or represented in decision-making bodies.		• *Could not be supported.*

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: EXAMPLES OF SOME ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES (STÅLGREN, 2006)

1. Legal and financial reform. Legal and financial instruments to battle corruption include reformed procurement procedures, monitoring and oversight, and increased economic competition. Reducing complexity in regulation, licensing and control are central elements of these reforms. They are usually led by government agencies which in developing countries receive support from international development agencies and banks.

2. Reform of public service delivery systems, including modernised human resourses management focused on staff performance rather than affiliation to networks, political parties, clans or families. This aims to counteract the 'clientelist' dimension of corruption. Specialist IT systems guide procurement processes online, under the assumption that bidders may be more likely to file a complaint if they feel that this process has not been followed correctly. Also, standardised information systems reduce the likelihood of individual actors engaging in fraud and embezzlement, since deviations from regular processes can be detected much easier. Increasing public sector capacity is crucial as well, because of the complexity of water sector governance. When public officials deal with highly professional transnational companies they need to be excellently trained to detect irregularities on the private sector's side. Also, the public sector's financial foundation must be solid, since some transnational companies' annual turnover exceeds some developing countries' GDP.

3. Reform within the private sector has led to the development of specific anti-corruption measures, such as codes of conduct and internal anti-corruption and integrity standards. Integrity pacts, as developed by Transparency International, help to curb corruption as procurement stakeholders agree to refrain from engaging in the 'race for the highest bribe offered'. They also agree on mutual oversight mechanisms. By doing so, they avoid the 'collective action problem' of not knowing who is illicitly creating advantages for themselves within a procurement process. Other instruments within the private sector include internal company ombudsmen and whistle-blower protection, as well as internal compliance units (where they are credibly funded and supported by senior management).

4. Public awareness and capacity building. A powerful civil society can potentially thwart corrupt activities and mobilise public discontent against illegal practices. This area of anti-corruption measures is quite abstract but does translate into concrete actions as well. Instruments include the training of journalists to improve their investigative capacity or, in the case of a legal corruption charge, to cover and follow complex trials. It also covers supporting civil society organisations, such as NGOs, so they are able to follow complex procurement processes and fulfil an important watchdog function with respect to all fields of public action.

ANNEX 2: INVITATION LETTER

<div align="right">Xxxx, (date)</div>

Invitation for workshop: Annotated Water Integrity Scan for _____ (sub-sector)
Workshop date: _____

Dear _____,

This is to invite you on behalf of _____ and _____ to participate in a consultation to assess the integrity of the _____(sub-sector) where we will apply the Annotated Water Integrity Scan (see attached brochure) developed by the Water Integrity Network (WIN). The workshop is being organised by _____ and _____ and will be held on _____ (date) from 9.00 till 17.00 at _____(venue).

WIN is the leading coalition of organisations working to promote integrity and prevent corruption in the water sector. By forming strong partnerships and facilitating the formation of multi-stakeholder coalitions, its aim is to contribute to the reduction of poverty by promoting transparent and accountable water management.

Your participation would be highly appreciated.

The workshop will be facilitated by _____.

Please confirm your attendance by _____.

We very much look forward to your attendance.

Yours sincerely,

Annex 3: Example of workshop agenda for two sub-sectors working in parallel

Date:

Venue:

Time: 9:00 – 17:00 (9:00 – 18:00 if used as monitoring tool)

AGENDA

8: 30 – 9:00	Arrival / registration
9:00 – 9:15	Introduction of participants
9:15 – 9:20	Welcome statement
9:20 – 9:30	Presentation of water integrity network
9:30 – 10:30	Presentation on AWIS
10.30 – 10.45	Scoring by participants
10:45 – 11:15	Coffee / tea break
11:15 – 12:30	Group session (annotation PL, R and ACL)
12:30 – 13:45	Lunch break
13:45 – 15:00	Group sessions (annotation IPP and SP)
15:00 – 15:30	Coffee / tea break
15:30 – 16:30	Way forward (group session continued)
16:30 – 17:00	Evaluation
17:00	Closing

ANNEX 4: FORMAT FOR THE AWIS FOR URBAN OR RURAL WATER SUPPLY
ANNEXES AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD AT WWW.WATERINTEGRITYNETWORK.NET

	Urban water supply: policy and legislation (PL)		
Item	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
PL:T	1 = PL very limited and lacks clarity.		
	2 = PL partly developed but with important gaps.		
	3 = PL well established (pro-poor and gender sensitive). Perhaps few improvements needed.		
PL:A	1 = PL hardly or not at all applied with few institutions fulfilling their role.		
	2 = PL applied to a fair extent, but still with important limitations and (sections of the) institutions being weak.		
	3 = PL applied to a large extent and institutions are fit for their role and have ACM in place. At best few improvements needed.		
PL:P	1 = Stakeholders have no or very little access to information on PL and no complaint mechanism.		
	2 = Information is available but some may not be independent or not accessible to all. Stakeholders can express their views and complain.		
	3 = Stakeholders have good access to information, are actively consulted (pro-poor and gender sensitive) and/or represented in decision-making bodies. Only few improvements may be needed.		

	Urban water supply: regulation		
Item	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
R:T	1 = No or few regulations and institutions in place.		
	2 = Regulations and institutions are fairly well established but important gaps and weaknesses exist.		
	3 = Regulations and institutions are well established (pro-poor and gender sensitive). Only few improvements may be needed.		
R:A	1 = Regulation not or hardly applied, institutions partly established but weak and little ACM in place.		
	2 = Regulations are applied with limitations by more or less independent institutions with partial internal control mechanisms and ACM.		
	3 = A comprehensive set of regulations is quite actively applied by institution(s) with considerable autonomy and credible internal control and ACM. Only few improvements may be needed.		
R:P	1 = Stakeholders have very little access to information on PL and no complaint mechanisms.		
	2 = Information is available and accessible but perhaps not easily available to all and not independent. Stakeholders are informed and can express their views and complain.		
	3 = Good quality information is available and accessible. Stakeholders are actively consulted (pro-poor and gender sensitive) and/or represented in decision-making bodies. Only few improvements may be needed.		

	Urban water supply: investment projects and programmes		
Item	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
IPP:T	1 = No or few (possibly unclear) rules are available for design, procurement (tendering) and financial audits.		
	2 = Rules for design, procurement (tendering) and financial audits are fairly well established but have important gaps and few ACM are developed.		
	3 = Rules are well established (poverty and gender sensitive); independent audits requested and benchmarking envisaged. Only few improvements may be needed.		
IPP:A	1 = Design and procurement rules and technical and financial audits are not or poorly applied, controlling institutions and ACM are very weak.		
	2 = Design and procurement rules and technical and financial audits are applied but with limitations, institutions are partly active and ACM are partly applied.		
	3 = Rules and audits are actively applied and results are compared (benchmarking) by independent institutions and ACM are applied. Only few improvements may be needed.		
IPP:P	1 = Stakeholders generally have very little access to information and no complaint mechanisms.		
	2 = Information is available and accessible but perhaps not available to all and not independent. Stakeholders are informed and can express their views and complain.		
	3 = Stakeholders have access to quality information, can file complaints and are consulted (gender and pro-poor), and/or represented in decision-making bodies. Only few improvements may be needed.		

Item	Urban water supply: service provision (SP)		
	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
SP:T	1 = No or few (possibly unclear) written rules are available concerning SP and the rights and duties of suppliers, users and other key actors.		
	2 = Rules for SP are established but have important gaps; ACM also show limitations.		
	3 = Comprehensive rules in place including adequate ACM. Only few improvements may be needed.		
SP:A	1 = No or few rules, audits and water delivery (quality) are applied, and no complaint mechanism exists.		
	2 = Rules including technical and financial audits are applied but with important limitations. This also goes for the application of ACM.		
	3 = Rules including audits and ACM are applied to all providers and results are compared (benchmarking). Only few improvements may be needed.		
SP:P	1 = Stakeholders have little or no access to information.		
	2 = Information is available and accessible but perhaps not easily available to all and not independent. Stakeholders are informed and can express their views / complain.		
	3 = Stakeholders have access to quality information, can file complaints and are consulted (gender and pro-poor), and/or represented in decision-making bodies. Only few improvements may be needed.		

	Country situation: anti-corruption legislation (ACL) and application		
Item	Scoring levels	Score	Annotation
ACL:T	1 = No or very limited (possibly unclear) ACL in place.		
	2 = ACL is in place but has important gaps or may only partly apply.		
	3 = ACL well established and comprehensive Only few improvements may be needed.		
ACL:A	1 = ACL hardly or not applied in the sub-sector and responsible control institutions are weak.		
	2 = ACL is applied but with important limitations and a limited number of cases are brought to justice. Civil society plays limited role.		
	3 = ACL effectively applied by independent institutions, cases are actively prosecuted and whistle blowers protected. Only few improvements may be needed.		
ACL:P	1 = Information about ACL and its implementation is not or hardly available and filing of corruption cases is complex and does not receive support.		
	2 = Reasonable access to information but may not be independent. Some cases of corruption are reported but press, civil society and whistle blowers face difficulties.		
	3 = Good access to independent information. Active anti-corruption movement with effective influence, pressure of the press and whistle-blower protection. Only few improvements may be needed.		

ANNEX 5: EXAMPLE SCORE CARD FOR URBAN WATER SUPPLY

(provide a score using these five options: 1; 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3)

This score card is to be completed by participants in the workshop. Similar cards can be prepared for rural water supply and other sub-sectors.

#	Item	Transparency	Accountability	Participation
1	Urban water supply policy and legislation			
2	Urban water supply regulation			
3	Urban water supply investment projects			
4	Urban water supply delivery			
5	Anti-corruption legislation and application			

Annex 6: Spreadsheet template

Annexes available for download at www.waterintegritynetwork.net

	UWS PL			UWS R			UWS IP			UWS SD			ACL		
	T	A	P	T	A	P	T	A	P	T	A	P	T	A	P
1															
2															
3															
4															
5															
6															
7															
8															
9															
10															
11															
12															
13															
14															
15															
Total	sum of the scores = sum(B3:Bn)														
Average	sum of the scores divided by number of scores = sum(B3:Bn)/n														
Stand Dev	standard deviation = stadev(B3:Bn) $$\sqrt{\frac{\Sigma(X - \bar{X})^2}{(n - 1)}}$$ where: X = each score; $\bar{X}$ = the average; n = the number of values; Σ means we sum across the values														

ANNEX 7: REPORT TEMPLATE

1. Introduction (Short note on AWIS, what it is, what it serves for and what this document is; Brief overview of sub-sector but preferably including the data sheet for the country that also has information on other sub-sectors.)

2. Introduction of the AWIS participants (who they are, number, background, organisational links - refer to list in annex).

3. Results:
   3.1. Quantitative (including graphical presentation)
   3.2. Overview of annotations
   3.3. Conclusions and recommendations
   3.4. Follow-up: What to do next? When is the next AWIS workshop?

4. Reflection:
   4.1. Results of the evaluation of the workshop by participants
   4.2. Suggestions for adjustment of the methodology.

5. Annex – List of participants

WIN Water
Integrity
Network
Fighting corruption in water worldwide